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There is no real agreement as to what would be a proper division of the
[international] tax base, nor is there any obvious principle of fairness that
can be invoked to justify any particular distribution of revenue. The
present division has been a more or less accidental result of the attempt to
eliminate double taxation, and is principally a product of the various
model double taxation treaties that have been adopted over a period of
some 60 years. Since the principal architects of these model treaties have
been the major capital-exporting countries, it seems reasonable to suppose
that, to the extent that the existing arrangements are inequitable, they
operate to the prejudice of countries that are primarily importers of
capital … and as the great majority of lesser-developed countries fall into
this category, there is the further consideration that some redistribution in
favour of source countries would on balance be desirable and would
promote a form of vertical equity among nations.

--- Alex Easson (1991) 1

The current international tax system allocates the taxation of cross-border income by
reference to the residence of the taxpayer and/or the source of income. The governing
rules are contained in domestic tax laws and bilateral tax treaties. As noted by Professor
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Easson, the current regime of allocation is not based on any real agreement between
nations and cannot be rationalized by any “obvious principle of fairness”. In fact, it is
biased in favour of the capital exporting nations that devised the rules of the game. In
order to improve fairness, Professor Easson considered it desirable to have some
“redistribution” in favour of less developed, net capital-importing nations. Professor
Easson was one of few legal scholars 2 that have emphasized the importance of internation equity. International tax literature has recently been preoccupied with efficiency
and welfare maximization, 3 predominantly from a one-country perspective. 4

This paper joins Professor Easson in his pursuit of inter-nation equity. The main
argument is that inter-nation equity in the sense of fair allocation of tax base as well as
international redistribution should be taken seriously in future tax reforms. It
demonstrates, at a conceptual level, that inter-nation equity can be improved through
adopting a territorial system of taxing business income and redesigning the tax sparing
system. The main goal of this paper is to tease out the conceptual challenge of identifying
inter-nation equity without suggesting any specific mechanism or process by which it
might conceivably be resolved.

The paper proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief overview of the concept internation equity (INE) in terms of allocation of international tax base and a modest element
of redistribution of tax base between nations. Part II makes the case for taking internation equity seriously in current international tax reforms. Part III demonstrates that a
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territorial system of taxing business profit is more equitable in sharing the tax base
between the source country and the residence country of the capital-owner. It also
demonstrates that the well-designed tax sparing system can function as a meaningful
redistribution system between countries. The paper ends with some general conclusions.

I. INTER-NATION EQUITY

A. The Concept

Peggy Musgrave adopted the term “inter-nation equity” in her work published in the
1960s. In United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income (1969) 5 she writes that
“international revenue sharing, as an aspect of the taxation of foreign investment, is a
matter of inter-nation equity”, and that “[a]lthough this problem is of little interest to the
private investor, it is a major concern of the countries involved…” 6 Over the years, internation equity has been variously described by Peggy and/or Richard Musgrave as an
“equitable division of the tax revenue between countries,” 7 “the problem of tax shares in
international business,” 8 and an equitable “allocation of national gain and loss.” 9

Legal scholars have phrased inter-nation equity to be the “distribution among countries of
the competence to tax”. 10 “A major goal of international tax rules should be to provide
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each country of the world with a fair share of the tax revenues available from income
generated by transnational activities of domestic and foreign taxpayers.” 11

As such, inter-nation equity differs from the other, and better known, notion of “equity” –
inter-individual equity based on the ability to pay principle. Inter-individual equity is
concerned with the sharing of the tax burden among taxpayers in a country (which can be
understood as “intra-nation equity”), whereas inter-nation equity is an international
problem and is concerned with the sharing of the tax base between nations. Inter-nation
equity is also different from international neutrality (capital-import neutrality or capital
export neutrality) or international efficiency. International tax neutrality toward
investment may be defined “as a situation in which the pattern of taxation does not
interfere with or affect the taxpayer’s choice between investing at home and investing in
foreign countries.” 12 It is “called for in the interests of world efficiency in resource
allocation.” 13 Leaving patriotism aside, taxpayers are directly affected by inter-individual
equity and international neutrality, but not inter-nation equity.

B. Tax Entitlement and Allocation of International Tax Base

According to Peggy Musgrave, the notion of “national entitlements” is the basis for internation equity. In her early work, Musgrave regarded inter-nation equity between the
home and host countries in terms of an equitable division of national gain and loss. 14 A
taxpayer’s income from foreign investment is part of the home country’s national gain
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because the home country has an initial interest in all of its taxpayers’ capital and
incomes. An income tax imposed by a host country thus results in a national loss to the
home country. Whether the home country also experiences a loss of revenue or “treasury
loss” depends on the method used by it to prevent double taxation. If the home country
uses the exemption method or credit method, the host country’s tax diminishes the home
country’s treasury, thus resulting in a “national loss”. The home country’s national loss is
a national gain to the host country. Musgrave’s recent work focuses more on the tax
entitlement of both the residence country and source country and the notion of
sovereignty. 15

In discussing the tax entitlement of the residence country, Musgrave states that “countries
will wish to retain a degree of sovereignty over the tax treatment of the income-earning
activities abroad of their residents.” 16 She advances several principles in support of the
residence country’s tax entitlements. One is economic allegiance: “residents are held to
owe tax allegiance in return for the rights and privileges that they receive as residents”.
Another is the ability-to-pay principle: “exercise of tax sovereignty over foreign source
income is also necessary to achieve equitable tax treatment of resident taxpayers by
making all income, wherever earned, subject to tax, consistent with the accretion
principle.” 17 The third is the benefit principle: “as a payment for productivity-enhancing
benefits provided by the country of residence to its own factors of production prior to
transfer abroad and for the rights and privileges afforded the corporation by its country of
registration.” 18 National interest may also be relevant in determining whether outflow of

6

capital should be encouraged or discouraged. Ultimately, the residence country’s tax
entitlement is only residual. However, as a residual taxing authority, the residence
country has control over the total tax burden of the foreign-source income of its resident
taxpayers. An exemption system would leave the foreign income taxed solely by the
source country, whereas a credit system may result in some tax payable to the residence
country if the foreign tax is lower. In the absence of cooperation the principal
consideration in making the choice are equitable.

Source countries are entitled to tax income arising within their borders, including that
accruing to foreign investors. Musgrave regards this entitlement to tax at source as “the
bedrock of most international tax treaties.” 19 A country is permitted “to share in the gains
of foreign-owned factors of production operating within its borders, gains that are
generated in cooperation with its own inputs, whether they be natural resources, an
educated or low-cost workforce, or proximity to a market.” 20 She rationalizes the source
country’s entitlements on the basis of “economic rent” –the source country’s tax “may be
thought of as a national return to the leasing of these complementary factors to
nonresident investors or temporary workers.” She also thinks of source country tax in
benefit terms, as a quid pro quo payment for cost-reducing, profit-enhancing services
provided by the source country.” 21

Musgrave’s formulation of inter-nation equity suggests that source entitlement and
residence entitlement stand on equal footing. Any inter-nation tax conflicts should be
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resolved through international coordination, as opposed to tax competition. Her primary
issue in inter-nation equity is the source country’s share in international income arising
within its borders.

C. Inter-nation Redistribution

The notion of inter-nation equity emphasizes fair allocation of tax base among countries.
The Musgraves did raise a concern about distributional consequences: “[w]ith a highly
unequal distribution of resource endowments and per capita income among countries and
in the absence of an adequate method for dealing with the problem, an appropriate pattern
of tax-imposed national gains and losses might be used to secure some degree of
adjustment.” 22 They suggested a mechanism for redistributing wealth internationally – an
internationally agreed rate schedule for corporate tax and withholding tax wherein tax
rates would relate inversely to per capita income in the source country and directly to per
capita income in the residence country. 23

The Musgraves did not provide any theoretical foundation for inter-nation redistribution.
In recent years, John Rawls’s theory of justice has been applied to inter-nation
distributive justice, in spite of Rawls’ own reticence in this regard. Rawls’ central
argument for domestic distributive justice is that individuals should not be disadvantaged
on account of arbitrary factors such as their social class, natural endowment, and
misfortune. 24 Global egalitarians have argued that neither should individuals be at a
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disadvantage due to an accidental fact like their country of birth. 25 If distributive justice
is motivated by the need to mitigate the effects of contingencies that are “arbitrary from a
moral point of view” on people’s life chances, this presents a consideration also for
global distributive justice. 26 Some legal scholars recognize that globalization has
increased the need for inter-nation redistribution 27 and argue that there appears to be no
sound theoretical reason to restrict redistribution to members of any single tax
jurisdiction. 28 Others argue, however, that effective redistribution needs a world
government. 29 In the absence of such world government, 30 a systematic redistribution is
unlikely. Nonetheless, redistribution between nations is becoming an increasingly
important concern and the tax system has a role to play.

II. WHY SHOULD EQUITY BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY NOW?

Inter-nation equity in terms of allocating the international base in accordance with the tax
entitlements of each country and re-distributing national income in accordance with
distributive justice should be taken seriously in international tax reforms for two main
reasons. One, it provides an important, and perhaps superior, policy framework than the
principle of neutralities to guide future reforms. Second, the inequities in the
international tax system are difficult to justify, let alone, perpetuate, in the age of
globalization. Inter-nation equity provides a rationale and goal for reforms to reduce such
inequities. The beginning of a new millennium is the right to act.
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A. Important Policy Criteria

Tax equity has been an important policy objective in domestic income tax policy.
However, recent proposals to reform international tax system in Canada, New Zealand,
United Kingdom, and United States 31 have focused on economic efficiency, almost to the
exclusion of all other values, as a criterion for international tax policy. 32 For example,
the Advisory Panel of Canada’s System of International Taxation recently published a
consultation paper -- Enhancing Canada’s International Tax Advantage 33 identifies the
policy framework to include attracting foreign investment, competitiveness, simplicity,
and fairness. It recognizes the theories of capital export neutrality (CEN), capital import
neutrality (CIN) and capital ownership neutrality (CON) may influence the choice
between an exemption system and a foreign tax credit system. Indeed, the
Advisory Panel expressed a preference for the exemption system over the credit system,
mainly on ground of CIN and CON. 34 The recent debates about the exemption or credit
system of taxing foreign business profits have been described as the “Battle of the
Neutralities.” 35

Relying on CEN, CIN and CON as guiding principles for international tax policy suffers
several shortcomings:
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(1) As recognized by the Panel, “fulfilling the three neutrality standards with a single
set of tax rules is impossible.” 36 Either a credit system or an exemption system
violates at least one of the principles.
(2) The conflicts between CEN and CIN/CON cannot be reconciled in the absence of
harmonization of every country’s tax rates. The Carter Commission argues that
neutrality requires tax harmonization between nations so that each individual is
unaffected, from a tax viewpoint, by citizenship, residence, and the locations of
property, business, and employment. 37 Of course, such harmonization is possible
only if all countries provide the same public expenditures mix, finance with the
same taxes at the same rates, and adjust the taxes simultaneously. Since one of
such criteria is unlikely to be met in practice, international neutrality cannot be
achieved. Even if tax harmonization were possible, the Commission notes that tax
revenues must still be allocated between source and destination countries, and in a
world of other distortions international neutrality may not be a sensible goal. 38
(3) There are disagreements as to what is needed to satisfy CIN or CEN. Traditionally,
CEN is considered satisfied by the accrual taxation or deferral plus credit
system, 39 and CIN is satisfied by the exemption system. Recently, some scholars
argue that exclusive source-based taxation (or territorial taxation) “seems to be a
theoretically, practically, and politically superior means for achieving CEN.” 40
(4) The practical implications of CIN and CEN are not as significant as they appear.
OECD countries generally impose some sort of accrual taxation of foreign
portfolio income (similar to the Canadian FAPI system). The apparent difference
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between deferral plus credit system (CEN-based) and the exemption system (CIN
based) results in little real difference if foreign business income earned through a
foreign corporation is not repatriated (that is, if the deferral lasts long enough). In
certain circumstances, because of the time value of money, the credit system
produces tax results that are better than the exemption system. 41

Therefore, the neutrality principles justify almost any proposal of reform: “[E]very
traditional discussion concludes by asserting that whatever policy is being proposed
represent a fair balance between those two irreconcilable objectives [CIN and CEN], in
every case based largely on the author’s preexisting intentions.” 42 It is time to take INE
seriously. Compared to the neutrality principles, the ability-to-pay and tax entitlement
principles that underlie inter-nation equity are more coherent internally and offer a
rational framework for the debate. For example, the ability-to-pay principle has been
accepted as a guiding principle in the development of personal income taxation, even
though the level of progressivity may have been controversial. Furthermore, tax
entitlement (although a much less debated issue in tax literature) has formed the bedrock
of the current tax treaty network. 43 At a minimum, the ability-to-pay principle and tax
entitlement principle should be considered.

B.

Equity as a Benchmark for Reducing International Tax Inequities
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The unfairness and inequities in the current international tax system have been well
identified in literature. For example, Easson noted that tax treaty rules have been
developed by major capital-exporting countries and operate to the prejudice of
developing countries. 44 Inter-nation equity can function as a benchmark for measuring
inequities as well as a goal for reforms.

The bias against capital-importing countries is evident in the history of the world’s tax
treaties. 45 Current tax treaties are based on the model tax conventions developed by the
OECD and the UN to a lesser extent. These treaties were originally developed primarily
to eliminate double taxation in order to facilitate cross-border trade and investment. The
elimination of double taxation is achieved mainly through restrictions on source taxation.
Treaty rules have the appearance of fairness because they are “reciprocal”. However, as
between a developing and a developed country, such reciprocity exists only in name,
because the developing country is a net-capital importing country. As such, any limitation
on source taxation reduces its tax base. 46 In the case of business income and income
from real estate where the tax entitlement of a source country is overwhelmingly strong,
inter-nation equity would require exclusive taxation of such income in the source country.

As noted by Peggy Musgrave that some redistribution of income between countries is
necessary in order to reduce the inequity resulted from allocating international tax based
in accordance with the tax entitlements because of the unequal natural endowments of
resources, etc. The need for such international redistribution is increasing because the

13

income gap between high-income and low-income countries has been increasing.
International inequity is evidenced by the fact that 23% of the world’s inhabitants absorb
a whopping 82% of the world’s wealth as measured by gross domestic products (GDP),
leaving 77% of the world to divide the remaining 18%. 47 Such inequity “dwarfs into
relative insignificance” the domestic distributive problem. 48 Since income tax has been
used as an effective instrument for redistributing income at a national level through
progressive taxation and various social tax expenditures, international income tax policy
could be used as a distributive instrument, albeit at a modest level. Tax treaties are
currently capable of redistributing the tax base whereby a high-income (residence)
country “transfers” its jurisdiction to tax to the low-income (source) country (such as
high withholding tax rates for investment income) or grants a tax sparing.

C. Opportune Time

The wheels of international tax reform churn slowly. At the beginning of the new
millennium, there appear to be forces that may speed up the reform. One force is the
increasing influence of the OECD as a de facto world tax organization. 49 The OECD can
play a significant role in coordinating the domestic tax policies of its member countries.
Its influence goes far beyond its membership. Through providing technical assistance to
non-member countries (such as China), maintaining and updating the OECD Model and
Commentaries, developing transfer pricing guidelines, and publishing policy papers, the
OECD exerts a great deal of influence on the tax policies of non-member countries.
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Should the OECD recognize the importance of inter-nation equity, it can mobilize forces
to do something about it.

Another force for change is domestic reforms. Major reform initiatives in Canada and
other OECD countries are likely to shift the system of taxing foreign business profits
towards an exemption or territorial system. As discussed below, such shift should have
positive implications for inter-nation equity. Recent developments in corporate tax in the
EU suggest that equity and fairness in sharing the international corporate tax base is
being taken seriously. 50 The outcome of the EU reforms may suggest technical solutions.
Tax reforms in low-income capital importing countries, such as China, have also
demonstrated a maturity in their international tax policy. For example, as of January 1,
2008, China abolished tax incentives that were designed in the 1980s and 1990s to attract
FDI and replaced them with general lower rates and tax incentives designed to promote
sustainable economic development. 51 The new Chinese tax law also emphasizes the
protection of the tax base through specific and general anti-avoidance rules (including
transfer pricing and thin capitalization) as well as defining the Chinese source of income
on the basis of the economic activities to reflect the Chinese view of tax entitlement.

There is also an emerging body of tax scholarship on inter-nation equity. 52 Tax scholars
have studied and applied the principle of inter-nation to the analysis of international tax
problems, such as the taxation of corporate income, 53 tax jurisdiction, 54 tax sparing, 55
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and redistribution across borders. 56 It is possible that some of the academic insights are
translated into reforms in domestic and or treaty law to achieve more equity.

III.

TAX REFORMS TOWARDS INTER-NATION EQUITY

A. The role of high-income countries

Any improvement in inter-nation equity must be initiated and supported by capitalexporting countries because they have the obligation and capability. There is a growing
awareness that the North-South divide “lies at the heart of the rich world’s current
troubles, including terrorism, immigration pressures, and environmental threats”. 57 These
global problems cannot be resolved by the South alone. Members of the United Nations
have unanimously agreed that the inequities must be addressed internationally and
pledged themselves to achieve the “Millennium Development Goals” by 2015. 58
Although developed countries have not fulfilled their obligations, there is no denying that
there is a recognition of the need for global justice and the intention of doing something
about it. Ultimately, reducing inequity serves the interest of developed countries as well.
Many developed countries are sympathetic to the claim for more source-based taxation
by developing countries and have adopted the provisions of the UN Model Convention at
various degrees, including tax sparing.
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Low-income countries have not played any meaningful role in developing the current
international tax system. They do not have an institution, such as the OECD, that can
effectively represent their tax interests. The United Nations has not functioned as a world
tax organization in any sense. Moreover, low-income countries have been competing
with each other in offering tax incentives to FDI, 59 even if the effectiveness and
efficiency of many tax incentives are doubtful. It seems difficult for these countries, as a
group, to end the “race-to-the-bottom” type of tax competition on their own. The
OECD’s initiative on harmful tax competition, although motivated mostly out of selfinterest of its member countries, seems to have encouraged some tax haven countries to
cooperate with OECD member countries. 60

In terms of actually implementing any change of reform, only developed countries have
the capacity. As mentioned already, the OECD is the closest thing we have as an
“international tax organization”. 61 OECD Member countries that provide homes for about
three quarters of the world’s multinational enterprises and whose citizens account for
well over half of the world income and wealth - The “rich holds the key to taxation
reform.” 62

B. Territorial Taxation of Business Income

The current system of international taxation recognizes the tax entitlement of the source
country in respect of business profits derived from activities carried on in that country.
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Foreign business profits earned directly by a domestic corporation are taxable in the
source country under bilateral treaties to the extent that they are attributable to a
permanent establishment in the source country. 63 Whether such profits are taxed again in
the residence country depends on that country’s domestic tax law. In “credit” countries
(e.g., Australia, Canada, Japan, UK, and US), the profits are taxable, subject to a foreign
tax credit for the source country’s tax. 64 In “exempt” countries (mostly continental
European countries), such profits are exempt from domestic taxation. As a result, the only
difference between the credit system and the exempt system is whether the residence
claims “residual” taxation over the foreign business profits. Therefore, if the residence
country adopts the credit system and limits the credit to the amount of domestic tax
otherwise payable, it implicitly allows the source country to tax income at the “soak-up”
rate (i.e., a rate that is equal to that in the residence country). If the residence country
adopts the exemption system, it gives the source country exclusive jurisdiction to tax.

Where foreign business profits are earned through a foreign corporation owned by
domestic residents, such profits are taxable solely in the source country. The residence
country of the shareholder does not tax such profits on a current basis, irrespective of it is
a credit country or an exempt country. However, when the profits are repatriated to the
shareholders by way of a dividend, the taxation of the dividend differs between a credit
country and an exempt country. The former would tax the dividends, subject to a direct
and indirect foreign tax credit for the foreign dividend withholding tax and underlying
corporate income tax. The latter would exempt the dividends from domestic taxation.
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Canada has a hybrid credit and exemption system: the latter applies on to business profits
earned in a treaty country. However, the “credit” or “exempt” treatment is limited to the
corporate shareholder of the foreign corporation. When the domestic parent corporation
distributes the dividends received from its foreign subsidiary to individual shareholders,
the dividends are generally taxable under personal income tax. In this sense, both credit
and exempt countries “share” the taxation of business profits, albeit on a deferred basis,
by taxing the individual shareholders on the repatriated profits.

The exempt system is gaining support in economic literature and many international tax
reform recommendations in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the
United States. In principle, the exemption system allows business profits to be subject to
territorial taxation. Territorial taxation is consistent with the tax entitlement theory and
promotes inter-nation equity. Business profits earned in the source country are taxed
exclusively at source at the corporate level, and again at the individual shareholder level
in the residence country. Assuming that the source rules and allocation rules are
“scientifically” designed to reflect the economic origin of business profits, the countries
that are entitled to tax such profits (i.e., the source country and the residence country of
the individual investor) share the taxation of business profits.

One drawback of territorial tax system is the risk of encouraging tax competition among
source countries because the level of corporate-level tax would be exclusively determined
by the source country. 65 The territorial system allows the foreign investor to directly
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benefit from the tax incentives granted by a source country, whereas a credit system
would “cancel” the benefits of tax incentives by taxing the business profits in the absence
of a tax sparing credit.

While territorial taxation of business profits promotes inter-nation equity, the same
cannot be said with territorial taxation of investment income. 66 The tax entitlement
claims of the source country over investment income are not nearly as strong as over
business income. The residence country of the investor has, in fact, a much stronger
claim. The goal of inter-nation equity is met if the residence country has the dominant, if
not exclusive, tax claim over international portfolio income. As such, the Canadian FAPI
regime, the U.S. Subpart F regime, and similar anti-deferral or imputation system of
taxing foreign passive income earned by controlled foreign corporations do not violate
inter-nation equity. 67

C.

Tax Sparing as a mechanism of International Redistribution

A tax sparing credit is, in essence, a credit for foreign taxes deemed paid for the purposes
of claiming foreign tax credit by the taxpayer in the residence country. Naturally, it is
relevant only when the residence country adopts the credit system of taxing foreign
income. If the residence country adopts the territorial system of taxation for business
profits, the tax sparing credit would be relevant only in the case of international portfolio
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income. Otherwise, it would be relevant in case of both foreign business income and
portfolio income.

The country that grants a tax sparing credit recognizes the tax entitlement of the source
country and supports the use of tax incentives by foregoing its residual tax claim over the
income that was exempt from tax in the source country. In other words, this is a crossborder tax subsidy, that explicitly benefits the taxpayer who invests in the source country,
but implicitly benefits the source country by “subsidizing” the investment. Because a tax
sparing credit is generally given by a high-income capital exporting country to a lowincome capital importing country through treaty negotiations, it can be viewed as
international redistribution mechanism.

There have been significant debates about the merits of tax sparing credits. Among the
many criticisms of this mechanism are the lack of transparency and accountability,
potential for abuse, and lack of a sun-set clause. 68 However, these criticisms seem to
point to technical design issues, not the theoretical rationale. Until an explicit
international redistribution system is established, abolishing tax sparing would remove
the only mechanism we have of international redistribution. 69

Instead of abolishing it, capital-exporting countries should re-design the tax sparing
mechanism to effectively deliver aid to “worthy” countries in respect of “worthy”
investment activities. 70 For example, tax sparing can be targeted at the incentives used to
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“jump start” an economy in the form of FDI or the transfer of technology. Such
mechanism would be an effective way of assisting the developing country without unduly
“encouraging” harmful tax competition.

CONCLUSIONS

A number of conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the discussions in this paper. First,
inter-nation equity in the sense of fair sharing of the international tax base has been the
foundation of the current international tax system, but there are significant inequities
towards net capital-importing countries. Intern-nation equity in the sense of
redistribution between nations has not been taken seriously. Second, inter-nation equity
deals with the sharing of the international tax base between countries, and does not, in
theory, adversely affect the allocation of resources or investors’ behaviour. There
appears to be no sound reasons to regard world efficiency and world equity as mutually
exclusive. Third, in the age of globalization, there are many international problems that
can be effectively addressed only by international efforts. As part of the international
legal system, the tax system has a role to play. High-income countries have the means
and obligation to affect changes to the international tax system in order to achieve equity.
Adopting territorial system of taxation and effective tax sparing credits are possible
examples.
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